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The experience and awareness of boundaries forms an integral part of being human. This article 
investigates the systematic philosophical underpinnings of our understanding of the nature of 
boundaries, in some instances supported by historical considerations. It stands to reason that 
boundaries are related to our awareness of spatial relationships, even though this awareness cannot 
avoid incorporating the distinction between entities and properties, reflected in the distinction 
between the concrete what and the how of reality. Differences between the original (mathematical) 
meaning of space and other contexts within which we encounter analogies of spatial boundaries 
are considered by paying attention to the problem of accounting for physical space (which is 
neither continuous nor infinitely divisible), biotic and sensory space (compare notions such as 
Umwelt, ambient and environment) as well as the significance of closed and open systems also for 
inter-human relationships displaying a solidary unitary character, analogous to thermodynamic 
open systems. Boundaries between different modes of explanation finally underscore the typical 
on-going task of philosophy, namely to investigate boundary questions. It will be argued that the 
problem of the multivocal nature of the term boundary only finds a satisfactory solution if it is 
embedded in a non-reductionist ontology.
Key concepts: boundaries, analogical contexts, irreducibility, uniqueness (primitive terms), non-
reductionist ontology
Die ervaring van grense vorm ‘n integrale deel van menswees. Hierdie artikel ondersoek die 
sistematies-wysgerige onderbou van ons verstaan van die aard van grense. In sommige gevalle 
word hierdie ondersoek ondersteun deur oorwegings uit die geskiedenis van die filosofie en 
die vakwetenskappe. Dit spreek vanself dat grense verband hou met ons besef van ruimte-
verhoudinge, selfs al kan hierdie besef nie ontkom aan die onderskeiding tussen entiteite en hul 
eienskappe, soos wat dit gereflekteer word in die onderskeid tussen die konkrete wat en die hoe 
van die werklikheid nie. Verskille tussen die oorspronklike (wiskundige) sin van ruimte en ander 
kontekste waarin analogieë van die aard van ruimtelike grense ter sprake kom, word in oënskou 
geneem deur die probleem aan die orde te stel van hoe ons rekenskap moet gee byvoorbeeld 
van fisieke ruimte (wat nie kontinu en oneindig verdeelbaar is nie), biotiese en sensitiewe ruimte 
(bedink terme oos Umwelt, “ambient” en omgewing), asook die betekenis van geslote en oop 
sisteme, ook vir die aard van inter-menslike relasies wat oor ‘n solidêre eenheidskarakter beskik, 
analoog aan termodinamiese oop sisteme. Die grense tussen verskillende verklaringsmodi belig 
die voortgaande taak van die filosofie om rekenskap van grensvrae te gee. Die argument wat gevoer 
word loop uit op die gevolgtrekking dat die probleem van ‘n meersinnige gebruik van terme soos 
grense slegs tot ‘n bevredigende oplossing gebring kan word indien hierdie probleem in ‘n nie-
reduksionistiese ontologie ingebed word.
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The key issue investigated in this article concerns the question 
how our richly varied awareness of boundaries could be related 
to a shared basic problem. It is argued that the notion of 
a “boundary” is indeed embedded in widely differing contexts, 
which raises the question whether these contexts are related in 
a univocal or multivocal way. If the term “boundary,” as it 
appears in different contexts, does not have the “same meaning”, 
then the challenge will be to investigate its multivocality and 
find a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. Another 
way to formulate the problem is: are there similarities and 
differences attached to the term boundary as it is employed in 
different contexts and if so, how do we have to account for such 
differences and similarities? Intimately related to this issue is 
the problem regarding different modes of explanation. Are such 
modes of explanation unique and irreducible? If the answer is 
affirmative, then the term “boundary” inevitably will display an 
inherent ambiguity or multivocality. Searching for an answer to 
these problems will have to account for the coherence between 
what is unique and irreducible. Yourgrau explains this problem 
with reference to Gödel who “insisted that to know the primitive 
concepts, one must not only understand their relationships 
to the other primitives but must grasp them on their own, by 
a kind of ‘intuition’ ” (Yourgrau 2005:169). Perhaps the most 
basic question is whether these problems could be resolved by 
means of a non-reductionist ontology.
1. LIFE-WORLD
From our early childhood onwards we encounter borders. 
The inside and outside of a house, the inside and outside of the 
yard, and eventually, in geography classes at school, we learn 
more about municipalities, districts, provinces, states, that is to 
say about the outside world.
This growing awareness is implicitly accompanied by the 
boundaries between different academic disciplines, including 
the natural sciences and the humanities. These disciplinary 
boundaries in turn reflect the boundaries demarcating 
the phenomena of everyday experience. If there are no 
boundaries between the various special sciences as well as 
“objective” reality, the universe will collapse into an amorphous 
nothingness, while all the academic disciplines will come 
together in an unidentifiable heap of chaos, for without 
boundaries it would be impossible to identify and distinguish. 
To identify something requires the presence of something that 
can be delineated, i.e., defined. Since analysis always at once 
entails an act of identification (concept formation) and an act 
of distinguishing, we first look at the relationship between 
analysis and boundaries.
2. ANALYSIS AND BOUNDARIES
To be sure, understanding reality requires the human ability to 
demarcate, that is, to think and conceptualize. Concepts in turn 
are intimately connected to a delimitation of those properties 
falling within and outside its boundaries. Defining something 
inevitably therefore has to specify what is demarcated and what 
not. This applies both to the acquisition of non-theoretical 
and theoretical concepts. In everyday life identifying and 
distinguishing things and events serve as a necessary condition 
for living an orientated life. Without the presence of this 
ability our life orientation will disintegrate. At the same time 
our sense of history and the science of history will collapse. 
Since language also depends upon the logical-analytical ability 
to identify and distinguish, the absence of boundaries will 
eliminate the foundation of (scientific) communication.
A related problem is whether or not there is an “original” 
meaning that can be attached to the term boundary?
3. THE SPATIAL NATURE OF A 
BOUNDARY
Sooner or later the question arises: What is the nature of 
a boundary? Obviously our first intuition should relate this 
question to our awareness of space. Is our awareness of what 
is inside and outside not dependent upon the spatial reality of 
a closed surface, such as a circle, a plane or a cube?
But what kind of space do we have in mind? Is it physical 
space? If so, are there other kinds of space? Is there a difference 
between Euclidean (or non-Euclidean) space on the one hand 
and physical space on the other? May we say, on a more general 
level, that mathematical space differs from physical space? 
And what about the bio-milieu of living entities, their Umwelt – 
is it a kind of biotic space? Moreover, why are we aware of still 
other kinds of space, such as emotional space, logical space, 
cultural space, semantic domains or social space?
In order to find an answer to these questions another distinction 
ought to be considered first of all.
4. ENTITIES AND PROPERTIES
Perhaps these questions may be related to a different distinction, 
namely that between what is concrete and what is abstract. 
For example, is physical space “concrete” and mathematical 
space “abstract”? This question suggests that there is 
a difference between the concrete “what” (thingness) of reality 
and the “how,” the different ways, modes or aspects within which 
all things function. Although the distinction between what and 
how is sound, it may convey the mistaken impression that the 
various aspects of reality, as modes of being are not real, that 
they do not have an ontic status. Are they not merely modes 
of thought, as Descartes asserted by stating that number and 
all universals are nothing but modes of thought (Principles 
of Philosophy, Part I, LVII)? We may even go further back and 
consider the views of Aristotle. His understanding relates to the 
problem of discreteness and continuity.
5. FROM ARISTOTLE TO MATHEMATICS 
AS GEOMETRY
Aristotle holds that “quantity is either discrete, or continuous” 
(Categoriae, 4 b 20). He continues with the assertion that “[n]
umber, ... is a discrete quantity” (Cat., 4 b 31), which means that 
a discrete quantity does not have a common limit or boundary. 
However, in the case of a line as a continuous quantity, it 
does have common limits or boundaries among its parts 
(see Cat., 4b 25ff., 5 a 1ff.). This entails that continuity displays 
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an endless divisibility: “everything continuous is divisible 
into divisibles that are infinitely divisible” (Phys., 231 b 15-17; 
Aristotle 2001:317).
Unfortunately introducing quantity as a genus concept [genus 
proximum], with discreteness and continuity as embodying 
specific differences [differentia specifica], denies the uniqueness 
and irreducibility of number and space. Nonetheless, Greek 
philosophy and mathematics have set the scene, witnessing 
an on-going attempt either to reduce space to number or 
number to space. With the discovery of irrational (so-called 
incommensurable) numbers, the initial Pythagorean thesis 
that everything is number gave way to a geometrization of 
mathematics, a perspective dominating the scene until 
the end of the 19th century when Weierstrass, Cantor and 
Dedekind believed having accomplished a new arithmetization 
of mathematics. However, early in the 20th century Frege 
once more reverted to the view that mathematics actually 
is geometry.1 
6. THE CONTINUUM: SMOOTH 
INFINITESIMAL ANALYSIS
At the beginning of the 21st century the French mathematician 
Longo remarks that for Thom and many other “mathematicians 
of the continuum” the continuum ontologically precedes 
the discrete. The latter, discreteness, has to be appreciated 
negatively as “a broken line” (Longo 2001:6) or even a catastrophe 
(Longo 2001:19). And more recently, in the development of 
“smooth infinitesimal analysis” (SAI), the impossibility of 
reducing continuity to discreteness is categorically affirmed by 
Bell: “Smooth infinitesimal analysis provides an image of the 
world in which the continuous is an autonomous notion, not 
explicable in terms of the discrete” (Bell 2006:284). Note that 
the idea of “an autonomous notion” is equivalent to what Gödel 
had in mind with his idea of “primitives” – mentioned earlier.
Modern mathematics continues to reflect on this relation 
between discreteness and continuity. In a twofold sense it 
relates to the problem of what a boundary is: (i) what is discrete 
appears to lack a common boundary and (ii) if continuity cannot 
be arithmetized there is an unbridgeable boundary between 
the aspects of number and space. These remarks need to be 
elucidated in some more detail.
7. DISCRETENESS: THE LACK OF A 
COMMON BOUNDARY
Merely looking at number and space already reveals more 
than one instance of the notion of a boundary. Since numbers 
are distinct, discreteness applies to all kinds of numbers. Two 
distinct numbers never have a shared boundary. Paul Bernays, 
the co-worker of David Hilbert, also accepts discreteness and 
continuity in their irreducibility and as a result he questions 
the idea that mathematics could be completely arithmetized: 
1  “The more I have thought the matter over, the more convinced I have 
become that arithmetic and geometry have developed on the same 
basis – a geometrical one in fact – so that mathematics in its entirety 
is really geometry” (Frege 1979: 277).
“We have to concede that the classical foundation of the theory 
of real numbers by Cantor and Dedekind does not constitute 
a complete arithmetization of mathematics. It is anyway very 
doubtful whether a complete arithmetization of the idea of the 
continuum could be fully justified. The idea of the continuum 
is after all originally a geometric idea” (Bernays 1976:187-188). 
In his Introduction to Infinitesimal Mathematics, Laugwitz states 
that from the outset Cantor’s set concept is constructed in 
such a way that what is continuous withdraws itself from its 
grip. According to Cantor a set unites (in the sense of bringing 
together – “Zusammenfassung”) properly distinct objects 
(“wohlunterschiedener Dinge”) into a whole (see Cantor 
1895:481). From this Laugwitz concludes: “the discrete reigns” 
(“das Diskrete herrscht” – Laugwitz 1986:10). What is truly 
discrete does not have common boundaries – as asserted by 
Aristotle.
The original spatial meaning of continuity immediately 
differentiates into multiple dimensions of spatial extension 
and these distinct dimensions are correlated with distinct 
magnitudes. How does this insight then contribute to an 
understanding of boundaries?
8. DIMENSIONS AND MAGNITUDES
From a spatial perspective both multiple dimensions and 
various magnitudes are expressed by using numbers. 
The infinite divisibility of spatial continuity, as noted already, 
and appreciated by Aristotle, represents one feature of 
continuity. That every point of division is taken twice provides 
the other criterion, also already recognized by Aristotle. Böhme 
shows that Cantor’s definition of the continuum contains 
two elements met by the Aristotelian definition: coherence 
and dividing points for infinite division (Böhme 1966:309). 
While only allowing a Dedekind-cut at divisions, Böhme 
substantiates his argument as follows:
when a Cantorian continuum as such is divided into 
two by means of the indication of a point so that the 
one set contains those points which are in numerical 
value greater than or equal to the indicated point, 
while the other set contains those points of which 
the numerical value are smaller than or equal to the 
numerical value of the indicated point, both parts are 
again continuous. Such divisions are possible into 
infinity (due to the perfection of the continuum), and 
the parts are still coherent in the Aristotelian sense 
(i.e. their limit-points [boundaries] are the same) 
(Böhme 1966:309).
At this point an additional perspective is needed in order to 
comprehend how the notion of a boundary actually entails 
what presently shall be designated as the spatial subject-object 
relation.
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9. BOUNDARIES: THE SPATIAL SUBJECT-
OBJECT RELATION
Aristotle employs the notion of a boundary (or limit) also in his 
theory of abstraction, reminiscent of spatial notions. Later on 
Thomas Aquinas articulated a similar view while accounting 
for a one-dimensional line in terms of successive abstractions. 
A line-stretch is delimited by points as its extremities (“cuius 
extremitates sunt duo puncta” – Summa Theologica, I,85,8).
The one-dimensional extension of a line-stretch is delimited by 
its one-dimensional boundaries, its starting point and end point. 
Within one dimension points are spatial objects because they 
are not extended in one dimension. Lines, as one-dimensional 
subjects, may play a similar limiting (boundary) role in two 
dimensions, for example when three straight lines delimit 
a triangle, which is a spatial subject in two dimensions. 
Likewise a multiple number of two-dimensional subjects, such 
as surfaces, can serve as the boundaries of a cube as a three-
dimensional spatial subject. A spatial subject in n dimensions 
can therefore be a spatial object in n+1 dimensions. As a spatial 
object in one dimension a spatial point is a subject in zero 
dimensions. In terms of the fundamental difference between a 
spatial subject and a spatial object, it is impossible to deduce 
spatial extension from spatial objects (points).
Continuous dimensional extension highlights the core 
(primitive) meaning of space, its irreducibility, while at the 
same time it reveals the coherence between space and number: 
there are 1, 2, 3 or more dimensions (let us call this a numerical 
analogy within the aspect of space) while magnitudes are also 
expressed in specifying numbers (such as three feet, ten square 
miles, and so on).
The next problem concerns the question if other aspects, 
different from space, in their uniqueness also cohere with 
space – and if so, whether this phenomenon also depends upon 
similarities and differences? We first look at similarities and 
differences between the physical and spatial aspects.
10. DOES NATURE MAKE JUMPS? 
MATHEMATICAL SPACE AND PHYSICAL 
SPACE
Within a spatial context a boundary depends upon the spatial 
subject-object relation. Almost a hundred years ago Hermann 
Weyl objected to the set theoretical attempt to reduce the 
“continuum” to isolated points. He writes: “In order to present 
the continuous coherence of the points, contemporary analysis, 
because it has broken apart the continuum into isolated 
points, had to take recourse to the concept of an environment” 
(Weyl 1921:77).
Since Leibniz introduced his idea of the law of continuity 
(lex continui), wedded to the belief that nature does not 
make jumps (natura non facit saltus), natural scientists have 
been convinced that physical space is both continuous and 
infinitely divisible. However, in his commemorative article on 
Weierstrass which appeared in 1925 in Mathematische Annalen, 
Hilbert points out that physical space is neither continuous 
(by being bound to energy quanta) nor infinitely divisible 
(Hilbert 1925:164). Both mathematical space and physical space 
are extended, highlighting what is similar between them. Yet 
within this similarity the difference between mathematical space 
and physical space evinces itself, for whereas mathematical 
space is continuous and infinitely divisible, physical space is 
neither continuous nor infinitely divisible.2 Within the moment 
of similarity (being extended), the difference shows itself – in 
being and not being continuous and infinitely divisible. This 
is precisely what an analogy is all about. When two entities 
or aspects are similar in that respect in which they differ (and 
vice versa), we meet a genuine analogy. In the configuration 
of physical space we therefore discern a mathematical analogy 
within the physical aspect.3
One may also consider in what sense physics treats closed and 
open systems, because it enables one to see an “open border.”
11. PHYSICS: THE THERMODYNAMICS OF 
CLOSED SYSTEMS
The first main law of modern physics, the law of the conservation 
of energy, states that since energy cannot be created or 
destroyed, over time the total energy of an isolated system 
remains constant. Perhaps a more precise formulation is found 
in designating it as the law of energy-constancy. 
The second main law of thermodynamics, the law of non-
decreasing entropy, was initially formulated for closed systems 
only. Within biology the problem of increasing order (decreasing 
entropy) appeared to be incompatible with the second law. The 
neo-vitalistic biologist, Hans Driesch, introduced an immaterial 
vital force, also designated as entelechie or psychoide, in order to 
solve this problem. He continues the deterministic conception 
of causality and aims at applying it to biotic phenomena as well.
12. THE VITALIST ATTEMPT TO 
INTRODUCE AN IMMATERIAL VITAL 
FORCE
A hundred years ago the neo-vitalism of Driesch dominated 
the scene on the basis of experimental research done on 
regeneration phenomena. It was discovered that at an early 
stage of development some animals are capable of regenerating 
an entire living entity from a small part of it. In the case of 
certain animals a part as tiny as 1/280th can regenerate an entire 
animal. When a sea urchin with four cells is divided every single 
cell is capable of regenerating an entire mature sea urchin. This 
2 Bernays has a clear understanding of this difference between 
physical space and mathematical space: “Only through the 
contemporary development of geometry and physics did it become 
necessary to distinguish between space as something physical 
and space as an ideal multiplicity determined by spatial laws” 
(Bernays 1976:37, note 5).
3 Maddy addresses this issue as follows: “But it is also true that the 
appearance of, say, a continuous manifold in our best description 
of space-time does not seem to be regarded as establishing the 
continuity of space-time; the microstructure of spacetime remains an 
open question” (Maddy, 2005:455).
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suggests that every part has an equal potential to regenerate 
the whole organism, but if these parts are not separated they 
will not develop their full potential. Driesch holds that the vital 
force is responsible for harmonizing the potential of all the 
parts. As a result Driesch views living entities as “equi-potential 
harmonious systems.”
According to him the vital force (entelechie) operates as 
a “totality-causal factor” (Ganzheitskausalität). He appreciates 
entelechie as a “system of negations” (Driesch 1921:513; 459 
ff.), for it is non-mechanical, not energy, not force, not a constant 
(Driesch 1921:460) and non-spatial (Driesch 1921:513).
Yet it appears as if growth processes violate the law of non-
decreasing entropy, for we note that according to this law within 
a closed system what is most probable would be an increase in 
disorder (the opposite of increasing complexity accompanying 
growth). This prompted Von Betalanffy to introduce a different 
understanding of borders by distinguishing what is “closed” 
and what is “open”.
13. VON BERTALANFFY: INTRODUCING 
OPEN SYSTEMS
Ludwig von Bertalanffy soon expanded the second main law 
of thermodynamics (the law of non-decreasing entropy) to 
open systems, that is, to systems constantly in interaction with 
their environments. Non-living material processes, such as 
a glacier, a fire or an idling vehicle, are physical systems without 
fixed boundaries, because they are thermodynamically open. 
Although living entities are guided by their characteristic 
biotic function, they also have a function within the physical 
aspect of reality. 
Karl Trincher distinguishes four macroscopic properties of the 
cell:
(a) spatial macroscopy, defining the boundaries of the 
cell through a spatially delimited surface; (b) temporal 
macroscopy, determining a finite time duration 
within which the energy cycle of the cell takes place – 
a continuous process of assimilation and dissimilation 
of building material; (c) the isothermal nature of the 
cell manifested in maintaining the same temperature 
throughout the cell; and 
(d) the enduring positive difference between the 
internal temperature of the cell and the external 
temperature of the environment adjacent to the cell 
surface, where the former is higher than the latter 
(Trincher 1985:336).
It is therefore clear that living things do not violate the law of 
non-decreasing entropy because the increasing order within 
such living entities is still less than the order extracted from 
the outside. Schrödinger calls this negentropy (negative entropy 
– Schrödinger 1955:71 ff.). Negentropy creates more disorder 
outside the living entity than the order built up inside it, thus 
illustrating the idea of an open border which is peculiar to 
thermodynamically open systems.
These developments caused neo-vitalist biologists to alter their 
arguments.
14. AN “INSTABILITY FACTOR” AND 
POSITIONALITY: SCHUBERT-
SOLDERN AND PLESSNER
The approach of Driesch is continued by Rainer Schubert-
Soldern who formulates further biochemical arguments 
in support of his neo-vitalist position. It is remarkable that 
from a physical perspective a living entity prevails in a state 
of high statistical improbability, flowing from the fact that 
from a thermodynamic perspective it is an open system. It 
forms an unavoidable condition for the biotic health of living 
things, ensuring the biotic stability of such entities (a healthy 
state). The crucial point is that biotic stability requires and 
presupposes physical instability. At the same time physical 
stability (equilibrium) implies biotic instability (a sign that death 
is imminent). The neo-vitalist biologists who succeeded Hans 
Driesch, in particular Schubert-Soldern, introduced the phrase 
“instability factor” as a substitute for Hans Driesch’s entelechie 
(cf. Schubert-Soldern 1959:62, 68; 1962:102 ff.). Heitler calls 
this instability factor a central instance directing the eventual 
teleological activities of living things. This “biologischen 
Instanz” (biological instance) also specifies the following sub-
instances (Unter-Instanzen), namely organs, cells, organelles 
(Heitler 1976:16).
Helmut Plessner notes the crucial difference between physical 
things and living entities in respect of boundaries. His aim is 
to transcend what he considers a self-contradictory notion, 
namely the idea of an “entelechie,” passed on to him by Hans 
Driesch. His alternative is the notion of positionality. According 
to him the surrounding environment of physical entities serves 
as their delimiting boundary. However, when living entities are 
at stake this delimitation (boundary) is inherent to the entity 
itself, for example the membrane of a cell. This constitutes what 
Plessner calls positionality (Plessner 1975:291). More recently 
Trincher remarks that having a geometrically defined surface 
applies to macroscopic structures only, since even the largest 
macro-molecules are not delimited by a surface (see Trincher, 
1985:336).
The account found in the thought of Schubert-Soldern 
underscores the same point in different terms. According to 
him the functional and formal unit of life, the cell, depends on 
the actualization of a twofold potential: “(a) the ‘form’ or order 
of the cell, and (b) the chemical laws governing molecules.” 
He calls this “principle of order the ‘active potentiality’ of the 
material parts” (Schubert-Soldern 1962:102). This view goes 
back to Aristotle: “Hence the Aristotelian concept of entelechy 
corresponds exactly with the principle of order, which we see at 
work making the cell into a whole. It is a principle of wholeness 
which forms a unity from parts which would otherwise go their 
separate ways. Thus a hologenous system is born” (Schubert-
Soldern 1962:113). But what about the difference between 
animals and humans?
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15. INSTINCTIVELY SECURED AND 
MILIEU-BOUND ANIMALS: THE 
ECCENTRIC HUMAN BEING IS OPEN 
TO THE WORLD
Plessner holds that animals are closed and centric, thus 
distinguishing themselves from humans who are eccentric 
living beings. He then introduces the idea of Weltoffenheit 
(openness towards the world) (Plessner 1975:292; Plessner 
1975a:378). Being open towards the world entails that there are 
no inaccessible boundaries between humans and their ambients. 
Yet, as we noted, acknowledging the absence or presence of 
boundaries clearly plays an important role in understanding 
the nature and difference between material entities and living 
entities. But living entities do not form an amorphous group, 
although biologists always struggled to provide a water-tight 
classification of plants and animals.4
What Portmann designates as the instinctively secured nature 
of animals5 surfaces in inherited behavioural action patterns 
and they are contrasted with the Weltoffenheit of humans 
(Portmann 1990:79). Being open to the world further explores 
the idea of open boundaries.
We investigate first of all what it means to be secured by instincts.
16. EMOTIONAL BOUNDARIES: (NON-
CONCEPTUAL) INBORN ACTIVATING 
MECHANISMS
Particular stimuli or a combination of them may set in motion 
an action pattern that precedes any prior experience. It appears 
to be an inborn disposition. The American robin, a migrating 
songbird, known as Turdus migratorius (North American Robin), 
shows how a fake or dummy still triggers an inborn behavioural 
action pattern. In German it is designated as an inborn 
activating mechanism (“angeborene Auslösemechanismus” – 
AAM) which does not need any conceptual understanding. In 
the case of the robin this inborn activating mechanism enables 
it to differentiate between what should and what should not 
pass through established emotional boundaries (the domain 
of the bird). The bright red-breasted robin controls its own 
4 Alternatively up to five kingdoms have been proposed, demarcating 
Monera (bacteria, blue-green algae); Protista (protozoa, chrysophytes); 
Fungi (slime moulds, true fungi); Plantae (algae and higher plants); 
and Animalia (multicellular animals)” (see Bock, 1989:102). 
The current preference is to distinguish between Prokaryotes (without 
a nucleus) and Eukaryotes (with a nucleus). The former are mostly 
unicellular living entities without organelles with membranes as 
boundaries. Eukaryotes can be unicellular or multicellular and they 
may have a large number of sub-cellular organelles. In addition 
to the nucleus with its pores and nucleoles, other organelles found 
in the endoplasmic reticulum (either smooth or rough), are the 
endomembrane system, the Golgi apparatus (constituted by 
dictysome membranes), lysosomes, mitochondria, ribosomes, 
centrioles and peroxisomes. Classifying living entities in this way is 
dependent upon the presence or absence of boundaries.
5 Portmann appreciates Von Uexküll as the biologist who focused on 
the living subject in the centre of its Umwelt (Portmann 1970:XXIV).
domain. Observing fellow species members triggers a specific 
protection-action-pattern in the robin with a bright red breast.
Any normal “trespasser” entering this domain will be attacked. 
Yet no conceptual bordering off (delineation) is present, for in 
1943 Lack artificially constructed a substitute robin without a 
red breast and put it within the domain of a robin. No attack 
occurred! But the artificial construction of a robin with a red 
breast immediately once again activated the attack! The same 
result was reached in 1960 when Peiponen investigated the 
behaviour of blue-breast robins (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 2004:162-163).
What is absent in the behaviour of robins is the concept of 
a robin as a bird! For this reason it clearly differs from human 
perception which is capable of identifying a robin as a bird. 
Human perception is therefore cognitively opened up and 
deepened by means of conceptual representations and it allows 
for cognitively discerning conceptual boundaries.
17. SUBJECT-ORIENTED UMWELT-
SELECTION IN ANIMAL LIFE
Before we focus on the demarcating role of human cognitive 
abilities another feature of animal life, related to boundaries, 
requires our attention. Although we may be inclined to think 
that animals depend upon their environment, animals in fact, 
as sentient subjects, actively select and construe their bio-
milieu (ambient / Umwelt). They accomplish this on the basis of 
the sensory subject-object relation. Von Bertalanffy mentions 
that the sole reaction of the paramecium as a unicellular 
organism is to flee (this flight reaction is known as phobotaxis 
and it occurs in reacting to “diverse chemical, tactile, thermal, 
photic” etc. stimuli). In the absence of any specific sense 
organs, this reaction is quite remarkable because it appears to 
be sufficient to guide this animal to live in optimal conditions. 
What is not related to this fleeing reaction is simply degraded 
to non-existence. Von Bertalanffy points out that the “many 
things in the environment of the paramecium,” such as “algae, 
other infusoria, little crustaceans, mechanical obstacles and 
the like, are non-existent for it”. One stimulus is sufficient to 
trigger the flight reaction (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:241). This 
example demonstrates that the organizational and functional 
plan of a living entity is decisive in selecting what can become 
a “stimulus” and a “characteristic” to which the organism will 
react in a specific way:
According to von Uexküll’s view, any organism, so to 
speak, cuts out from the multiplicity of surrounding 
objects a small number of characteristics to which 
it reacts and whose ensemble forms its ‘ambient’ 
(Umwelt). All the rest is non-existent for that 
particular organism. Every animal is surrounded, 
as by a soap bubble, by its specific ambient, 
replenished by those characteristics which are 
amenable to it. If, when reconstructing an animal’s 
ambience, we enter this soap bubble, the world is 
profoundly changed: Many characteristics disappear, 
others arise, and a completely new world is found 
(Von Bertalanffy 1973:241).
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The boundaries between the “soap bubble” and a given 
environment demonstrate the active role of the animal subject 
in this regard, even though a striking poverty of sensory abilities 
may prevail. Jakob von Uexküll illustrates this point with 
reference to the world of a tick. A tick reduces its environment 
in an astonishing way, for at the edge of a branch in the bushes 
it awaits motionlessly the event of a passing mammal. No other 
stimulus from the total environment is noticed. But when 
a mammal approaches the tick lets go. Von Bertalanffy explains:
Take, for instance, a tick lurking in the bushes for 
a passing mammal in whose skin it settles and 
drinks itself full of blood. The signal is the odour of 
the butyric acid, flowing from the dermal glands of 
all mammals. Following this stimulus, it plunges 
down; if it fell on a warm body – as monitored off by 
its sensitive thermal sense – it has reached its prey, 
a warm-blooded animal, and only needs to find, aided 
by tactile sense, a hair-free place to pierce in. Thus the 
rich environment of the tick shrinks to metamorphize 
into a scanty configuration out of which only 
three signals, beaconlike, are gleaming which, 
however, suffice to lead the animal surely to its goal 
(Von Bertalanffy 1973:241).6
18. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AMBIENT 
AND ENVIRONMENT
Von Uexküll remarks that the “ambient” (“Umwelt”) and the 
“environment” (Umgebung) of an animal are not identical. 
What is remarkable is that of all the effects proceeding from 
the mammalian body, only three are turned into stimuli. From 
the grandiose world surrounding the tick these three stimuli 
serve as a guide for the tick to reach its goal with certainty. Its 
world encompasses only three characteristics and three actions 
(Merkmalen and Wirkmalen) (Jakob von Uexküll, 1970:12-13). 
Sea urchins may strike together their spines in reaction to the 
darkening caused by a cloud or by the danger of an approaching 
fish. Von Bertalnffy summarizes: “Thus, while the environment 
of the sea urchin contains many different objects, its ambient 
only contains one characteristic, namely, dimming of light” (Von 
Bertalanffy 1973:242). Moreover, as Thure von Uexküll points 
out, the ambients are not elements in an atomistic sense, for 
they are embedded within an encompassing “Planmäßigkeit” 
(Thure von Uexküll 1970:XXVI).
Clearly emotional boundaries simply differ from physical 
boundaries – a fact also illustrated by the difference between 
sensory and physical space.
19. SENSORY SPACE AND PHYSICAL 
SPACE
Similar to the above-mentioned distinction between physical 
space and mathematical space there is also a difference 
6 Of course it may happen that the tick needs to wait for quite a time 
before a mammal passes. But it is equipped to cope with this obstacle, 
for ticks have been reported to subsist for 18 years without food 
(cf. Jakob von Uexküll 1970:13-14)!
between sensory space and physical space. The human skin, 
for example, may experience separate pricks as continuous, 
even though they in fact are physically discontinuous (distinct) 
(see Gosztonyi, 1976, I:13). This demonstrates yet another 
(non-spatial) context within which the multivocality of spatial 
phenomena can be observed.
20. DISCERNING THE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN DIFFERENT MODES OF 
EXPLANATION
Human cognitive abilities can also be revealed, for example 
when analytical control or analytical mastery of a domain 
of knowledge takes place. This may occur when certain 
modes of being (modal aspects) are lifted out while others are 
disregarded. But lifting out and disregarding are nothing but 
what happens when abstraction takes place. Combining the 
nature of abstraction and the nature of modal aspects highlights 
the distinctive feature of scholarly thinking (including the 
natural sciences and the humanities), because it is typical of 
the special sciences to approach concrete reality through the 
gate-way of modal aspects which are then at once opened up 
to become modes of explanation. Through modal abstraction the 
functional boundaries between the various aspects of reality 
are brought to light. This observation only holds when these 
modes of explanation are irreducible, i.e. if we subscribe to 
a non-reductionist ontology.
21. THE ROLE OF BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
(UN-)DIFFERENTIATED SOCIETAL 
SPHERES
Distinct societal entities within a differentiated society assign 
a unique focus to communal and collective human actions by 
combining alternative qualifying functions with analogies of the 
spatial notion of spheres or circles. Consider expressions such 
as cultural-historical spheres, lingual spheres, social spheres, 
legal spheres, and so on.
Traditional undifferentiated societies display one fixed 
(“closed”) form of organization which does not allow for the 
free flow (interaction) between their members and those of other 
undifferentiated societies. The initial Roman ius civile, for 
example, was an exclusive undifferentiated folk law. Non-Romans 
did not have any rights since they were exlex, hostis (Mackenzie, 
1898:77ff.). A long cultural-historical process of differentiation 
was needed before more people around the world were taken 
up in the cultural intercourse between the various nations who 
participated peacefully in these interactions. Every distinct 
societal entity within a differentiated society is both open and 
closed – analogous to thermodynamically open systems. Insofar 
as the office-bearers of societal communities and collectivities 
occupy their respective offices, it is presupposed that there are 
set limits or boundaries for the competencies of these office-
bearers. Of course these boundaries entail a normative calling 
which could be carried out in a better or worse way.
The designation of the borders or boundaries of specific societal 
forms of life always fall back on one or another spatial notion. 
It was Groen van Prinsterer, Abraham Kuyper and Herman 
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Dooyeweerd who established the idea of sphere-sovereignty. 
More recent alternative characterizations of societal spheres 
continue to appeal to spatial terms, such as the inside-outside 
contrast. Münch speaks of the inner laws of societal entities, 
such as the state (Münch 1990:442, 444) Habermas uses the 
expression “own laws” (“Eigengesetzlichkeit” – Habermas 1995-
2:437), while Rawls holds that elements of society need some 
“sphere” with its “own principles” fitting “their peculiar nature” 
because there are “different principles for distinct kinds of 
subjects” (Rawls 1996:262).
22. PERSISTENCE AMIDST CHANGE: THE 
NATURE OF A SOLIDARY UNITARY 
CHARACTER
Within a differentiated society the acknowledgement of 
distinct societal spheres with their typical boundaries does not 
preclude a free and open interaction between societal entities. 
One of the features of particular communal relationships 
and societal collectivities is that they display a solidary 
unitary character. This property entails that communities and 
collectivities maintain their societal identities in spite of the 
coming and going of their individual members over time. 
It represents an analogy of thermodynamic open systems, 
where, as we noted earlier, the relative endurance of a physical 
system or of living entities is observed from the perspective of 
their typical functioning within the physical aspect. It embodies 
the kinematic and physical analogies within the social aspect. 
These kinematic and the physical analogies within the structure 
of the social aspect intends to capture the phenomenon that, 
in spite of the constant flow (coming and going, entering and 
leaving) of individual members of a societal collectivity, it still 
preserves the identity of the social form of life over time. 
This property reflects the solidary unitary character of certain 
societal entities. Ryan stumbled upon this feature where he 
writes about “fluctuating membership”:
There are regularities and constancies in the behavior of groups 
of people which allow us to talk about groups having a stable 
structure in spite of fluctuating membership, and about the 
existence of social roles which can be filled by different people 
at different points in time (Ryan 1980:174).
Similar to phenomena expressing themselves within 
the physical aspect, such as the open structure of certain 
thermodynamic processes, fluctuating membership therefore 
shows that analogies of thermodynamic open systems are 
also found within the social aspect, thus highlighting open 
boundaries within a differentiated society.
An interesting trait accompanies ecclesiastical law because it is 
attached to the person without obstructing physical boundaries 
between different congregations. Even if a church member 
leaves the boundaries of a congregation the authority over such 
a person is not suspended. This situation differs from what is 
the case in a constitutional state.
23. STATE BOUNDARIES: OPEN AND 
LIMITED
The modern idea of the state as a public legal institution 
rests on the basis of having the monopoly over state-power 
(the army against external threats and the police force for 
internally maintaining law and order) on its territory (a cultural 
area with set boundaries). Inter-state intercourse and the flow 
of tourists and migrants need open borders without generating 
a threat to the territorial integrity of a state. 




Thus far we have briefly discussed multiple instances of non-
spatial contexts in which the original (modal) spatial concept of 
a border acquires analogical meanings and we have highlighted 
the fact that these contexts require an appreciation from 
the perspective of a non-reductionist ontology. We conclude 
with a brief remark regarding the role of boundaries between 
academic disciplines and the significance of borders for 
philosophical reflection in general.
The horizon of experience of the world is constituted by 
mutually irreducible aspects, which at once may serve as ontic 
modes of explanation. When they serve the explanatory power 
of various academic disciplines their ontic status is presupposed. 
Owing to the inter-connections between the diverse aspects of 
reality, the selection of any aspect as angle of approach for the 
theoretical investigation of reality can never isolate itself from 
all the other modes of explanation. Just recall the coherence 
between the spatial and physical aspects where it appeared that 
the meaning of the physical aspect, among others, comes to 
expression in its coherence with the spatial aspect, evinced in 
the difference between mathematical space and physical space 
[although both are extended (the similarity between them) the 
former is continuous and infinitely divisible and the latter is 
neither continuous nor infinitely divisible].
It belongs to the task of philosophy to investigate the 
demarcation of the various entities and aspects of reality. In 
itself this task leads to an account of the various academic 
disciplines that employ the gate-way of these aspects to 
investigate reality.
One may here refer to the boundary problems with which 
philosophy continues to wrestle. Van Riessen even suggested 
that we should see philosophy as the discipline involved in 
analysing boundary questions (“grensvragen” – Van Riessen 
1970:11, 19, 20).
25. CONCLUDING REMARK
Although the nature of boundaries primarily directed our 
attention to space, we subsequently used multiple examples to 
argue that the awareness of boundaries forms an integral part of 
our experience of the universe. But a proper understanding of 
boundaries does require a refined analysis of apparently widely 
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diverging phenomena, one in which both the uniqueness and 
unbreakable coherence between its various manifestations are 
accounted for. Without an implicit or explicit knowledge of 
them, human life will disintegrate and become directionless, 
and only a non-reductionist ontology can safeguard us against 
one-sided -ismic orientations which aim at reducing the 
rich diversity of aspects and (natural and social) entities to 
one or another reified perspective, such as is known to us in 
physicalism, vitalism, psychologism, logicism, historicism, 
materialism, aestheticism, legalism, moralism or pietism.
What has not been done in the present article is to account 
for the kind of knowledge surfacing when we approximate 
what lies beyond the grasp of normal concept formation. For 
example, it belongs to the classical legacy in epistemology to 
note that since concept formation is directed towards what 
is universal, conceptual knowledge is blind towards what is 
individual (de singularibus non est scientia = of what is singular 
no science is possible). Yet we still have knowledge of what is 
unique and individual. This opens the way towards a reflection 
on the nature of concept-transcending knowledge – exceeding 
the scope of this article.
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